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I take as my text for this lecture a quotation from the
American Social Psychologist, W. I. Thomas: `Things
which are perceived as real will be real in their
consequences’. Thomas was pointing to something which
today we would regard almost as a truism, namely that
people behave on the basis of their perceptions of reality,
rather than that reality itself. Indeed Thomas, who was
writing in the 1920s in Chicago, founded what was to
become a school of social psychology known as `symbolic
interactionism’. The jargon need not detain us except to note
that what symbolic interactionism implies is that people
interact with each other partly on the basis of symbols,
rather than reality. When I use phrases like Flixborough,
Seveso, Chernobyl, Brent Spar, or even Sella® eld and, most
potent of all, BSE, I am not speaking of these places or
things in any literal sense, but of what they have come to
representÐ to symbolize. This distinction between reality
and perceptionÐ which in the social world are very rarely
one and the same thingÐ has come to lie at the centre of
recent debates on the nature of risk.
I should explain at the outset that I do not regard myself
as an expert on the study of risk. I am not, as most of you
will know, a natural scientist. I do not even regard myself
these days as a practising social scientist, although that is
my background. In recent years I suppose I would claim
some day-to-day experience of research management and
it was through my former chairmanship of the Economic
and Social Research Council that I became acquainted with,
and participantly observed, the interface between science and
public policy. So whatever expertise I may claim, it can only
be that of a kind of lapsed social scientist who has in recent
years fallen amongst science policy-makers both in the
public and private sectors.
It was in this capacity that I foundmyself a member of the
Royal Society Study Group on Risk under the chairmanship
of Sir Frederick Warner and which published its report in
1992, Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management. This
was a follow-up to a previous Royal Society Study Group
report, Risk Assessment, which had been published in 1983.
My membership of this Study Group was an educational, if
not always an informative, experience. As is by now well
known, the Study Group’ s report was an almost classic case
study of what C. P. Snow called `the two cultures’ . The
natural and social scientists involved in the Study Group’ s
deliberations approached the whole issue of risk from totally
different standpoints. The scientists and engineers insisted
on de® ning the problem in terms of risk assessment; the
social scientists, even when they were sometimes talking
about similar phenomena, insisted in speaking in terms of
risk perception. The two groups simply talked past one
another rather than to each other. The report re¯ ected this
and it has, I suppose, become something of a cause ceÂleÁ bre
on the mutual suspicion with which social and natural
scientists sometimes hold one another.
This is a pity and part of the purpose of this lecture is to
try to bridge this gap. But these disputes have not been part
of some trivial academic spat: there are serious implications
for public policy and innovation in the market place. Both
politicians and senior industrialists have frequently been
caught by surprise by the public reaction to innovations
which they assumed were not contentious. Waste disposal,
genetically engineered organisms, food irradiation, food
additivesÐ the litany could be extended at length. Many
people seem very happy to take the most enormous risks in
their private lives, but react violently against statistically
tiny risks in the public domain. It hardly needs to be added
that such perceptions in turn in¯ uence the political and
policy framework governing the pace and direction of
technological change and, ultimately therefore, economic
competitiveness. But then things which are perceived as
real, will be real in their consequences.
From the perspective of the social scientist, then, risk
perception involves peoples’ beliefs, attitudes, judgements
and feelingsÐ the socio-cultural values and dispositions
that people adopt towards hazards and their bene® ts. It
follows that the perception of risk is multidimensional,with
a particular hazard meaning different things to different
people (depending, for example, upon their underlying
value systems) and different things in different contexts. As
the Royal Society Study Group in which I participated
pointed out, in some circumstances, important aspects of
risk perception and acceptability involve judgements not
just of the physical characteristics and consequences of an
activity, but also social and organizational factors such as
the credibility and trustworthiness of risk management and
regulatory institutions.What is clear to a social scientist, but
seems so very dif® cult for some scientists and engineers to
accept, is that risk perception cannot be reduced to a single
subjective correlate of a particular mathematical model of
risk, such as the product of probabilities and consequences,
because this imposes unduly restrictive assumptions about
what is an essentially human and social phenomenon.When
the Royal Society report was discussed at a Foundation of
Science and Technology dinner a member of the audience
gave a rather useful example of this. He pointed out that,
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notwithstanding a huge increase in road traf® c since the
1930s, the risk of an accident occurring involving
pedestrians had been reduced by a factor of four over the
same period. But try, he suggested, suggesting that to a
mother of a young child. If you want to explain why she
(and the child) behave as they do, it is their perception of the
risks which are decisive; the quantitative risk assessment
does not take you very far.
Risk is, therefore, a social construct. It was this phrase,
perhaps more than any other, which so infuriated the
scientists and engineers in the Royal Society Study Group.
But perhaps this was because the issue was oversimpli® ed.
Risk is a social construct, but it is not only a social construct.
Many risks can only be perceived with the help of science.
And if one draws a distinction between fact and value (which
I certainly do) then science cannot be simply explained away
as, for example, some cultural anthropologists have some-
times appeared to imply. My conclusion is in some ways a
much more pragmatic one. Scientists may be able to
explain the facts, but the facts rarely speak for themselves.
The facts are interpreted by individualswho may behave in
quite different ways to those which scientists, or public
policy-makers, or the industrialists, originally intended.
RISK AND THE MODERN WORLD
Why has risk become such an important issue in modern
debate?
Notwithstanding the emergence of new hazards there is
little doubt that the world is a less risky place for its
inhabitants than it was 50 or even 100 years ago. Most
accident rates continue to fall and there are continuing
increases in life expectancy. And there is the paradox that
we have already noted between the risks which people are
prepared to take in their private lives and those which they
perceive when introduced from elsewhere. One resolution
of this paradox is to relate risk to uncertainty. The pace of
changeÐ both technological and socialÐ has created a
generally heightened sense of uncertainty. The past is no
longer a guide to the future; explanation may not be
equivalent to prediction. In a world which has become,
according to many, increasingly globalized, the individual
may feel less control over his or her daily life. And this
world is also a more complex world, one in which, because
of the extreme division of labour in modern industrial
societies, we perforce must rely upon the expertise of others
on matters over which we are ourselves relatively ignorant.
Risk, uncertainty, vulnerability, trustÐ this seems like a
lexicon of the human condition as we move towards the 21st
century. In this sense, the discussion of risk is no more than a
metaphor for a changing society struggling to come to terms
with itself. Ever since the Enlightenment we have been
prepared to believe that human progress can be achieved via
the pursuit of knowledge. Now there are many people who
have their doubts. The debate over risk is in part a debate
over the contemporary state of the human condition.
In the UK the public debate on risk has been very much
focused on environmental risk, while this term has, in
turn, been so widely interpreted as to encompass a whole
host of modern discontents. Environmental risk has, there-
fore, become a central dimension for public debate and
policy-making. This is re¯ ected in the establishment of
various non-government organizations from the 1960s
onwards which evolved from impoverished and marginal
protest groups in the 1960s and 1970s, to well-resourced and
formally recognized policy actors by the late 1980s. This
has been paralleled by a growth in the volume of legislation
and the resources devoted in both private and public sectors
to regulation and research. Along with this massively
increased attention there have been several important
qualitative changes in the public discussion of environ-
mental risk. I clearly do not have the time nor space to deal
with this in detail, but I do wish to make one salient point.
As society moves from tackling local risks from a single
type of source (such as, say, the licensing of a new drug,
or regulation of worker safety) to concern with global
impacts from phenomena with multiple source types (such
as climate change), the uncertainties expand exponentially.
Society debates over what to do in the uncertain light of this
incomplete knowledge involve larger segments of the
population, more diverse constituencies, higher costs of
risk identi® cation and amelioration, and more complex
constraints on personal and institutional economic activ-
ities. Such debates also have the potential to become
extremely divisive as environmental expenditure increases
to compete with other desirable social goods. We may be
able to understand these debates better and to intervene in
them more constructively if we are able to determine what
makes some people focus on one set of uncertainties rather
than another and how arguments about uncertainty are used
to justify action or inaction on any particular issue.
As the American anthropologist, Steve Rayner, has
pointed out, uncertainty is conventionally viewed as the
grey area between the darkness of ignorance (or the absence
of knowledge) and the light of certainty (or the presence of
demonstrated knowledge). This view is quite appropriate to
the level of laboratory science where the focus is on margins
of error in experimental measurements under highly
controlled conditions. Another source of this view of
uncertainty as imprecision arises in engineering design
where margins of safety are allowed around estimates for the
behaviour of materials or structures because of actuarial
experience of past failure rates, or to allow for errors in
the calculation of normal stresses or incidence of extreme
events. The representation of uncertainty as a linear range
around a given measure or estimate and the view of
knowledge as the progressive discovery of objective truth
both suggest that uncertainty is always remediable, at least in
principle, by improvedmeasurement or further investigation.
Now clearly, science will always be concerned with
increasing the precision of measurements or estimates of
important transformations in the environment. However,
equally clearly, there are qualitatively different types
of uncertainty involved in understanding environmental
systems which are compounded when natural systems are
subjected to human impacts and management efforts.
This is an altogether more messy world than that of the
laboratory or the computer simulation. Here, the analysis of
risk interfaces with both science and public policy,
including politics. As we are all aware, so far the experience
of this in the UK has not been a very happy one.Why is this?
RISK, SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
As I have written elsewhere, one of the more fascinating
aspects of recent debates about risk is the way in which it
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re¯ ects a new kind of relationship between research and
policy. In the past, to use a distinctionmade by Jerry Ravetz,
the relationship was predicated on the belief that science
provided decision-makers with objective, `hard’ facts on
which to base their `soft’ , value-ridden policies. But when it
comes to the study of risk, the big question of the day is
simple: can science give us answers based on certainty? For
centuries we have been taught and conditioned to assume
that science is certainty. If not today, then tomorrow,
scientists would make the discoveries that would remove
our worries about disease, hunger and even our social
affairs. Yet now some doubts creep in. The study of risk is
but one area where we now ® nd scientists delivering only
`soft’ uncertain facts to decision-makers facing `hard’
decisions. Politicians demand to know what is `safe’ ,
while scientists can only state that nothing is ever risk free.
Typically we ® nd that the facts are uncertain, values in
dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent; and the framing of
the problem involves politics and values as much as science.
Quite oftenÐ as in the case of Brent SparÐ questions are
thrust upon the scienti® c community because of their
practical urgency, regardless of whether they can be solved
immediately.
Of course, the decision-making process does not require
classic scienti® c certainty; politics is all about the manage-
ment of uncertainty along with the reconciliation of
con¯ icting interests. So science cannot simply be reduced
to policies in this way. Indeed, in dealing with such
complex problems the scienti® c experts are rank political
amateurs. They bring essential skills and information. But
their contributions are to a debate rather than to a rigid
demonstration which can conclusively prove something.
To social scientists long accustomed to dealing with the
subtle distinction between objectivity and value neutrality,
this experience is a familiar one. Social scientists have
often tended to bring policy-makers news about social
problems, rather than solutions; the assessment of environ-
mental risk is placing natural scientists in a somewhat
analogous situation, since many of the `solutions’ lie
no more in their sphere of in¯ uence than they do in that
of social scientists. Very many natural scientists ® nd
this role uncomfortable, since it disrupts the established
taken-for-granted relationship between science and politics.
It also presents a problem for politicians in search of
scienti® c legitimacy for their decisions: an appeal to the
scienti® c `facts’ is a handy device to shut down the much
more messy debate necessary to manage uncertainty as well
as to reconcile con¯ icting interests. But it is ultimately
dangerous where the problem is intractable to scienti® c
investigation and technical ® xes aloneÐ as a catalogue of
recent cases from nuclear energy policy to the international
regulation of ozone-depleting chemicals has shown. As far
as environmental risk is concerned, as we move away from
the expression of abstract goalsÐ even those with a socio-
economic content like much health and safety regulationÐ
to the actual means of achieving them (regulation, taxation,
etc.) so the costs become clearer to the public at large and
the con¯ icts of interest will inevitably emerge. How else is
the debate maintained over somethingÐ the reduction of
environmental hazardsÐ which we all support? As the
distributional consequences of these costs are made
manifest to the public, so its attention is concentrated on
the uncertainties of the science (such as the epidemiological
models of new-variant Creuzfeld Jakob disease) in order to
persuade politicians to remove the certain burden of
increased costs. Scientists are then left to rue the apparent
irrationality of the public in refusing to accept the best
scienti® c evidence, while politicians will be looking for
scapegoats for their public unpopularity.
Familiar? Social scientists learned their lesson the hard
way in the failure to link social science with social
engineering in the 1960s. When it comes to scapegoating,
the allegations do not have to be true, merely plausibleÐ
ask any urban planner. The solutions to the problems
associated with various environmental risks are rarely
amenable to technical ® xes alone, no more can they be
handled by an equal and opposite `social’ ® x. It is the
interplay between the technical and the human which will
hold the key. Public consent to changes in policy, let alone
lifestyles, would be essential. Hence the centrality of social
science enquiry to the management of risk.
The scienti® c study of risk cannot, therefore, be limited
solely to `getting the science right’ . It is simply not the case
that once you get the science right, so better decisions are
sure to follow. Scientists, I know, will feel uneasy about
this. Equally, however, natural scientists need to recognize
that social science can no more pull the policy rabbit out of
the risk management hat than they can. Social scientists can
provide better information on which to base policy and can
indicate the likely consequences of certain policy options,
but it is not the role of social scientists to make those
decisions themselves. Having implicitly criticized techno-
cratic dominance over policy-making, I am not about to
substitute for it an equally misguided concept of social
engineering. Anyone who tells you otherwise is usually
trying to sell you something.
RISK MANAGEMENT
So what is to be done? I am arrogant enough to believe
that events since the publication of the Royal Society Study
Group Report in 1992 have reinforced rather than under-
mined the analysis set out in the two chapters authored by
social scientists. To remind you, those chapters set out four
key trends in the understanding of risk perception. Firstly,
that the distinction that had previously been maintained
between `objective’ risk and `subjective’ perceived risk,
was no longer a tenable position. Secondly, that with the
extension of early research, the psychological study of risk
perception had matured into an established ® eld founded on
cognitive psychology and the study of decision-making
behaviour. Thirdly, it observed that risk communication had
emerged as a key topic of concern, linking the work in basic
risk perception research to questions of policy formulation,
legislative frameworks and public participation in decision-
making about hazards. In particular the issue of trust in risk
management institutions is highlightedÐ somethingwhich I
shall return to below. Finally, in what it identi® es as `perhaps
the most signi® cant’ development, the Report notes that the
signi® cance of social, cultural and political processes in
shaping individuals’ attitudes towards and the social
acceptability of risks has been widely acknowledged.
Taken together the thrust of these points was to
underline the argument that perceptions of risk are
shaped by complex social and psychological processes
and are not the product of purely cognitive valuations. This
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is an issue of considerable interest in relation to risk
communication attempts at behavioural modi® cation. Cen-
tral to this is the question of public trust (and distrust) in
those institutions responsible for managing risk, whether
public or private. Currently there is a good deal of research
interest in those factors which engender, or destroy, trust.
There is also, inevitably, considerable debate about what
constitutes trust and its role in social organization, which I
will not rehearse here. As a minimal working de® nition,
however, trust can be seen as involving a willing acceptance
of vulnerability, based on the expectations that certain
criteria will be met. For example, these criteria might
include expectations about the commitment of an organiza-
tion to its obligations, about its competence over time to
meet those obligations, about the extent to which it cares
about those to which it is in that relationship of trust, and
about the extent to which those obligations might pre-
dictably be expected to be met. Thus, perceptions that an
event was the result of managerial incompetence, and may
therefore signal the risk of future failures, has been
identi® ed as a determinant of distrust and public response.
Given the emphasis now being given to the importance of
trust for understanding public risk perceptions, the usual
question of how much risk the public will tolerate can even
be reframed as `how much distrust will the public tolerate’ .
On this basis and with my tongue only slightly in my
cheek, I now offer you Newby’ s guide to commercial ruin or
how to turn a tiny environmental risk into a major public
relations disaster.
(1) The ® rst principle could be termed, EXPERTS KNOW
BEST. The basic principle here is to ensure that only a very
small group with the requisite technical expertise are
empowered to take risk-management decisions which will
affect the lives of the largest possible group. All other
stakeholders in this decision, including those whose lives
are affected by it, should immediately be denied information
and access on the grounds that they could not possibly
understand the complex issues involved.
Less facetiously there is an important issue here
concerning the authority of experts. It is noticeable that in
the contemporary world, the word `expert’ is scarcely used
without it being prefaced by the phrase, `so-called’ .
Technical expertise is rarely allowed to prevail unchal-
lenged. We live in a less-deferential society and also a more
educated one. As I have already mentioned, in many of the
areas covered by risk management the facts are to a greater
or lesser extent uncertain. In this context science is a
method, not a body of established fact, a way of overturning
certainties, not of proclaiming them. This, it should be
noted, is often as uncomfortable to the public at large as it is
to the scienti® c community itself. Nevertheless, opening up
the relevant decisions and monitoring processes to wider
scrutiny and attention from the multiple stakeholders
involved tends to result in better-informed and less error-
prone decisions. Such extension is, of course, already the
accepted practice where the ethical complexities of
scienti® c work cannot be resolved within the boundaries
of science and where non-scientists representing special
perspectives and interests set permissible limits on scienti® c
work. In settings of this kind the extension of such
participation needs to be regarded not so much as a
benevolent act, but as a functional necessity for improving
the quality of both decision-making and implementation,
by broadening the base, ® rst of knowledge and criticism,
and then of consensus and responsibility. In this way a
new `social contract’ of science can be achieved in which
there is a common respect for a plurality of competences,
perspectives and commitments among the different
stakeholders in a risk management issue.
(2) The second principle is BE WISE ONLY AFTER THE
EVENT. In other words this could be put as, never
anticipate the worst, always hope for the best.
In practice, of course, this is anathema to risk managers.
Risk management always in practice involves some element
of anticipation: the key question is how far should this go. In
recent years there has certainly been greater emphasis paid
to methods of ex-ante-detection and prevention and on
regular `health checks’ (audits) on potentially dangerous
organizations or locations. This has been enshrined in the
extension of precautionary `just in case’ regulation. Clearly,
there are dif® cult issues as to exactly how far the
precautionary principle ought to be taken and how far
public policy should run ahead of clear scienti® c ® ndings.
Precautionary measures often involve substantial compli-
ance costs and these have to be traded off against, promoting
the capacity to cope with the unexpected, for example, by
relief, emergency action, rescue and insurance.
(3) Thirdly, BLAME SOMEONE WHO IS POWERLESS
TO FIGHT BACK. This always provokes public sympathy
for the `little guy’ and increases antagonismoutrage towards
senior management.
The important underlying point is the extent to which risk
management regimes at the margin should be more or less
`blame oriented’ . Those who favour a high blame approach
argue that effective risk management depends on the design
of incentive structures that place strict ® nancial and legal
liability for risk on those who are in the best position to take
action to minimize risk. Against this strict liability
approach, proponents of the opposing no blame view are
sceptical of the argument that a move to general
`criminalization’ of management will make for more
effective risk management and hold that it may be
ineffective or even counter-productive. Those who favour
this view believe it leads to facts being concealed or
seriously distorted by such an adversarial process, with
negative consequences for risk management. Such a
reluctance to provide information in the face of possible
sanctions detracts from managing risk in such a way that
safety-critical issues can be anticipated.
(4) The fourth principle is, ONLY MANAGE WHAT YOU
CAN MEASURE. In other words, incorporate an uncritical
acceptance of quantitative risk assessment, bury the
assumptions on which it is based, and refuse to develop
any more qualitative approaches to supplement it.
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) clearly remains an
important policy tool, helping to expose anomalies and
special pleading and in that sense promoting rational policy-
making. The technical sophistication to which QRA lends
itself ® ts well with legal and bureaucratic requirements for
standard operating procedures and the approach has, of
course, been systematically adopted by many organizations.
It remains the backbone of `rational’ risk management in the
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UK, particularly in areas of complex socio-technical risk
and for many types of natural hazard. QRA is not a panacea.
More commonly, it involves a different judgement as to
what the balance should be between QRA and other sources
of information and judgement. Unfortunately at its most
dogmatic QRA can actually be harmful as a tool for risk
management. QRA, although convenient for organizations
facing public attack for their handling of risks, tends to
exaggerate the ability to quantify risks reliably and may
direct attention away from rarely-occurring, hard-to-quantify
areas.
(5) The ® fth principle can be summarized as CHE SERA
SERA: anything else is too expensive. Risks are unknown
and unknowable and therefore unmanageable. Any expen-
diture on risk management is therefore a waste of money
and in any case detracts from the bottom line. It’ s cheaper in
both the short and long run to clear up the mess after it has
happened.
The serious point underlying this approach is the extent to
which organizational design should fully integrate risk
management, including the extent to which risk manage-
ment is regarded as an integral part of the management of an
organization per se.
The conventional `no free lunch’ trade-off model of
economics offers a clear starting point for risk management
as it focuses attention very sharply on discounted costs and
bene® ts. Those who adopt a trade-off position argue that
increases in safety must normally come at the expense of
other valued objectives, such as wealth creation, inter-
national competitiveness and productivity or economic
dynamism and environmental degradation. Against this
view is an alternative position which holds that high safety
standards may be achieved in conjunction with other goals,
and also that good risk management is one of the signs of
good management in general. This, in turn, inspires public
trust which, as we have already seen, is often a key to
public risk perception.
So there you have it. Five simple principles: experts know
best; be wise only after the event; blame someone who is
powerless to ® ght back; only manage what you can
measure; che sera sera. Adherence to these ® ve principles
should ensure there are a series of public relations disasters,
fall in demand for your product and declining market share.
They will also raise public suspicion, rather than public
trust, a greater willingness to believe Greenpeace and
Friends of the Earth rather than a minister, a senior public
servant or a corporate executive. It is, actually, quite easy to
achieve. The reverse, of course, is not. Understanding and
managing the distinction between risk assessment and risk
perception is dif® cult, complex, and the outcomes are
uncertain. It itself constitutes a risk. But in reality there is no
alternative. The things which are real will be real in their
consequences. Let us, please, once and for all move away
from that old declension:
I am an expert
You are ignorant
They are irrational
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